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IN Tl!E S'.JPRE:·!E COUF.T OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
H~RRY J. CHPISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiff-
Appella:-it, 
l-"T;>.H TP~;.'JSI'I .~J.iTHO:OITY 
and JOH~l G. MILLE?., 
Defendants-
?.espondents. 
BRIEF OF P.ESPmlDENTS 
Case No. 17250 
NATURE OF THE c.~_sE 
This is an action filed by the plaintiff against 
defenda:1ts Ctah Transit Authority and John G. Miller for 
alleged da~ages arising frcrn a minor accident between 
Plai~tiff and a UTA bus. 
DISPOSITION IN LOhER COURT 
A jury trial was held with the Honorable G. Hal Taylor 
presidi:1g. The jury returned a special verdict finding 
the plaintiff 70% negligent, the defendants 30% negligent, 
and awar::ed special damages of $7, 700 and general damage 
of $5,000. The Court subsequently entered judgment in 
Ce'.'enda:1ts' favor of no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-respondents seek affirmance of the jury 
·;erdict and t'1e lower court judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because Respondents believe that the "Statement of 
the Facts" contained in Appellant's brief is both inaccur~ 
in some respects and fails to include pertinent facts 
relied upon by the jury, Respondents offer their own fact~ 
statement. It should be noted, [wwe·:er, t:-:at any referer.c: 
to the damage testimony and evidence during trial will be 
reserved for review in the Argument portion of this brie: 
~~ that Plaintiff has failed to raise any substantial 
issue of damages requiring factual review. 
The lawsuit in this matter involved an accident which 
occurred between a bus owned and operated t:/ the l7ta!1 
Transit Authority and driven by John G. Miller and a Must~ 
automobile owned and operated by the plainti±:f Harr:/ J. 
Christiansen. While it is undisputed that an accident die 
occur at 7th East and 21st South on Januar:/ 17, 1978, the 
two versions of the accident are considerably different 
and it cannot, therefore, be said that the facts are 
"uncontroverted" as stated in Plaintiff's brief. 
brief, p. 2). 
(Appellar: 
Plaintiff testified that on Januar:/ 17, 1978, he had 
gone to a doctor's office to give him a bid on installing 
plumbing. After completion of this work t!1e plaintiff 
proceeded south in his automobile on 7th east. (Tr. 253-25: 
It was about 6:00 o'clock p.m. when the plaintiff left the 
-2-
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doctor's office. There was a light rain falling. The 
plaintiff s~a~ed that at that time it was dark but the 
visibility was good. (Tr. 354). 
The plaintiff characterized the traffic as fairly 
heavy on 7th East and estimated that he was traveling between 
35 and 40 miles an hour as he left the intersection of 17th 
South and 7th East. He stated that he first observed the 
UTA bus shortly after leaving that intersection. 
3 5 5) • 
(Tr. 354-
The plaintiff stated that he continued down the road 
and turned into the right-hand lane in preparation of a 
right turn down 21st South. He stated that he stopped 
behind another U~A bus which was near the intersection. 
(Tr. 355). He estimated that he had turned into the right-
hand lane approximately one-half or one block before the 
intersection and that he stopped about 10 feet behind the 
bus. He stated he did this because he did not like the 
smell of emissions from buses. (Tr. 355). 
The plaintiff recalled that as he was stopped he 
looked in his rear-view mirror to see where the bus was 
that he had passed and noticed that it was coming but quite 
a distance back. He believed that the bus was about one-
half block back when he first looked in his mirror. (Tr. 
356). The plaintiff claimed that he had been stopped in 
the right lane for more than a minute before the accident 
-3-
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occurred. (Tr. 387). 
The plaintiff testitied that as he was looking at 
the parked bus in front of him he felt a surge and heard 
a bang. He stated that he felt himself going forward and 
could see the dash or the visor of the window as it kicked 
his head forward, thereby kinking it. He testified that 
after this impact he could not remember too ~uch more. 
(Tr. 365). 
He recalled, however, that he felt dazed a~d reme~~er; 
the bus driver coming to his window and asking ~im if 
wanted a police officer to investigate. According to 
Plaintiff, the bus driver commented he would probably lose 
his job and then asked him again if he wanted to contact 
the police. The plaintiff replied he did and the bus 
driver said he would make the call. (Tr. 357). 
Shortly thereafter a UTA supervisor arrived and told 
the plaintiff that it would be quite some time before the 
police would come and requested that the dri·.rers exchange 
information rather than waiting for the police. (Tr. 358). 
The plaintiff admitted that he did not tell the drive~ 
or the supervisor that he was injured and stated that he 
was too dazed and wobbly to make such a suggestion. (Tr. 
389). 
Plaintiff stated that when he arrived home he felt 
dazed and that his mother gave him some aspirin and told 
-4-
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;, l:r1 tri l i 2 down. (Tr. 359). He stated that he was anxious 
tc s~c ~cw much damage had ~c~n done to his car and there-
fore caref~lly exa~ined it at home. 
He decided to go to the UTA offices and report addi-
tional damage. He, his mother, and father, drove to the 
GTA main offices and talked to the same supervisor who was 
at the scene of the accident concerning additional damage 
to the car. (Tr. 360). Plaintiff again admitted that during 
this lat~r conversation he did not say anything to the super-
visor concerning his physical condition since he was still 
dazed and was not ttin~i~g clearl. 'Tr. 397). 
Since the defendant John Grant ~iller was not present 
at the tria: his deposition was read and introduced into 
evicence by t::ie p~:: ·:'.tiff. ~:r. Miller stated that on 
January 17, 1978, he was driving the Cottonwood Heights 
route which included a southbound run on 7th East. He 
stated that the traffic was moderate to heavy and that it 
was raining a little but the streets were not wet. (Depo-
sition of John Grant Miller, taken January 8, 1980 and 
ren·cunbered as part of this record as pages 289-290). 
Defendant Miller recalled that he was driving in the 
ri ·ht-hand lane of 7th East and had just stopped to let 
out a passenger. This stop was located around 1950 South 
and 7tl-. Eas-:.. (R. 299). There was no other bus stop 
hetween that cne and the one located near the corner of 
-5-
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21st South and 7th East. ( R. 299) . 
Miller related that he pulled the bus back into the 
right lane and reached a speed of about 30 to 35 miles 
an hour which required about four or five seconds of 
travel time. (R. 298-299). Miller observed that the 21st 
South light was red and that another bus was sitting adjac: 
to the bus stop near the in~ersection. ( R . 2 9 2 ) • .C..s he 
came nearer to the intersection -ie began to slo·,.; down in 
preparation of stopping. 
At this point the plaintiff's ~ustang pulled into t~ 
=~s~~ la~e at a speed of about 30 to 35 ~iles an hour. 
(?. 293). Miller recalled that the ~ustang was some 25 ts 
30 feet in front of the bus when it pulled in front of t~e 
bus. (R. 308). He stated that he put his brakes on as 
soon as Plaintiff came into the lane in order to increase 
the distance between the bus and the Mustang and that he 
was attempting to slow down. (R. 309) . During the two or 
three seconds that both vehicles were moving together the 
defendant Miller stated he did not apply the brakes very 
hard because this would have thrown the passengers down 
the aisle. (R. 310). He stated he was attempting co 
increase the distance between the car and the bus since 
it was the company's policy to always i'\a~ntain approximate~. 
three seconds of distance between a bus ar.d a 'lehicle in 
front. (Tr. 287). However, ~iller stated he did not 
-6-
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believe the distance between the vehicles increased 
appreciably during this two or three second period. 
(R. 312). 
After the two or three seconds had elapsed the 
Mustang's brake lights suddenly came on and the Mustang 
nade what Miller characterized as a quick stop. (R. 293). 
The Mustang stopped approximately 50 feet behind the other 
bus that was located at the bus stop. (R. 300-301). 
Miller stated that the Mustang could not have been stopped 
for longer than one or two seconds before he bumped it. 
(R. 292) . 
At the time he saw the brake lights go on Miller 
stated that he immediately attempted to panic-stop the 
bi..;s. (R. 313). He recalled that the buses were equipped 
with computerized air brake systems which stopped the wheels 
from sliding even if a panic stop was being applied. (R. 288). 
Miller estimated that he hit the Mustang at between 
fi',-e and ten miles an hour. The Mustang rolled forward 
about 40 feet upon being hit since its brakes were not 
on but it did not hit the bus in front since there was over 
SO feet of space in between the two vehicles. (R. 295). 
A diagram prepared by Miller during his deposition 
was introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit 32 and was received 
as evidence. In addition, a report, used at the deposition 
alsc, which was filled out by Miller after the accident 
-7-
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Defendants called Douglas ~oodbury who is a fleet 
engineer for the UTA and who had conducted tests of UTA 
buses as to the effect that out-of-adjustment slack 
adjusters would have upon the stopping abilit:,· of the bus. 
Woodbury stated that until al 1 four slac:-c adjusters were 
out one and one-half turns the bus ·..;as still in conplianc; 
with state stopping standards. (Tr. 698). The 12 click 
adjustment referred to in the nechanic's report indicate: 
that the nuts were backed up only three-quarters of a tu:: 
Had all four wheels been backed off this anount t~e 
brakes 5~j __ ~~ulj ~ave met state guidelines and if only 
of the fou::- ·,,,::eels had been off this amount any de:icienc: 
would ::-.ave been further reduced to only 25 percent. (Tr. 
706). Stating it another way, Woodbury explained that i~ 
one wheel were completely off as to its slack adjuster ar.: 
the other three wheels were functioning properly the state 
standard of stopping would still be met. (Tr. 699). 
This occurred because each wheel produces 25 percent o: 
the braking force. (Tr. 449). 
As noted earlier, a number o: witnesses testified 
on behalf of Plaintiff as to the alleged injury and damage' 
incurred as a result of this accident. Li:-cewise, Defendar.: 
called several medical witnesses to refute these charges. 
At the conclusion of the evidence the matter was submitte~ 
to the jury by way of special interrogatories. 
-10-
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The jurj answered the S?ecial verdict form by finding 
that ?laintiff Harry J. Christiansen was negligent, that 
his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, 
that defendants UTA and John Miller were also negligent, 
that their negligence was also a proximate cause of the 
accident, and then alloted 70% of the negligence to plaintiff 
Christiansen and 30% to defendants UTA and Miller. In 
addition, the jury found special dar.iages of medical expense 
and lost wage~ of $7,700 and general damages of pain and 
suffering of $5,000. (R. 176-177). 
Subsequently, a judgment on the verdict was entered 
finding no cause of action in favor of the defendants. 
(?. 187-189). Plaintiff then made a motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new 
trial. (R. 190-191. At the time of hearing Plaintiff's 
attorney was not present but the court denied the motions 
based upon the merits and not upon the failure of Plaintiff's 
counsel to appear. (R. 192-194). 
This appeal is taken from the judgment on the verdict entered 
~ay 12, 1980, and from the order denying Plaintiff's motion for 
a new trial and judgment entered July 8, 1980. (R. 195). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 8 AND PROPERLY GAVE 
INSTRCCTIONS NUMBERED 21, 22, 23, AND 24. 
-11-
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Appellant devotes considerable arc;ument to his co:-:-
tention that the lower court improperly instructed t!le 
jury. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-16). An examination cf 
the arguments, however, shows that such contention is 
without merit. Appellant seems to base his objections upo~ 
speculation, inferences, and assum;:::,tions ·.vhicr. are not 
supported by the record and which, in any case, do :-iot gL·~ 
rise to reversible error. An examination of each of Plain-
tiff's assertions will now be made. 
~~e Court Properly Refused to Give Plaintiff's 
Requested Instruction No. 8. 
Instruction No. 8 is a JIFU instruction intended for 
use in those cases where a party has the obligatio:-i of 
calling a witness or offering evidence to support his 
position but fails to do so and relies upon weaker evidence 
for support. The instruction in this case, however, was 
inappropriate at least as to Defendants. 
Plaintiff complains that defendants should have callee 
three witnesses: John Miller; the signout supervisor; and 
the mechanic who inspected the brakes following t!le accidE~: 
Under Plaintiff's argument, Defendants had an o:Oligation :c 
call these people in order to bolster their defense as to 
Plaintiff's claim of faulty brakes. 
Plaintiff has misconstrued the context of t!lis trial. 
It was the burden of Plaintiff, not Defendants, to produce 
-12-
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strongec e~idence in support of his claim of faulty brakes. 
':''."le 1:>:csti:1ony cf John Miller in courl would not have 
assisted Defendants in any way since Miller already stated 
that in his opinion the brakes were not working as well as 
the--/ should be. In addition, when a witness testifies by 
wa; cf de~osition it cannot be said that the in-court 
testimony of the witness is of a stronger nature than his 
deposition testinony. Goggins v. Winkley, 495 P.2d 594 
\clont. 1972). 
1he evidence showed that the sign-out mechanic thought 
that the brakes were operating properly and released the 
bus tc Mr. ~iller. (R. 315-317). If Plaintiff wished to 
dispute this fact it was his obligation to subpoena the 
signout mechanic and examine him as tc what he based his 
O!='inion upon that the brakes were ?roperly working. It was 
Flaintiff's obligation to call the signout mechanic as 
his 0'.·1n •,;i tness if he wished to contradict the state of 
the evidence. Holland v. Kerr, 253 P.2d 88 (Cal. App. 1953). 
Likewise, the evidence showed that Chuck Wooley, the 
mechanic who worked on the bus following the accident, 
prepared dn~ submitted a report as to the condition of the 
slack adjusters. He noted that the left adjuster was out 
12 and that the right one had been replaced. Defendant 
called Douglas woodb11ry, a fleet engineer of UTA, and 
Charl2s Oliver, a lead foreman of UTA, as witnesses who 
-13-
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both explained what the "out of 12" nota.tion v.eant and 
why a slack adjuster is replaced. 
Since it was Plaintiff's burden to show n2gli~ence 
on the part of Defendants it was Plaintiff, not Defendant, 
who should have called Mr. Wooley to explain ?.ny differenc-
the "out of 12" notation meant from th?.t testified to by 
the UTA supervisors and to explai~ ex?.ctly why the right 
slack adjuster was replaced. For example, since Mr. \\·ocd-
~~r:· stated that slack adjusters are replaced either ~he~ 
the mechanism can no longer be adjusted or when it is nc~ 
properly functioning, it was Plaintiff's obligation to 
prove that the replacement occurred because of a defecti~ 
slack adjuster and not merely because it was no longer =~ 
tional. 
In addition, this type o:!" i:-cstruction is ;;ierely 
abstract and the giving or failure to give it is not pre-
judicial error. Bohle v. Matson ~avigation Co., 412 P.2d 
3 6 7 (Ore . 19 6 6) • 
B. The Trial Court Prope.::-1:: Gave Instruction :lo. 21. 
Appellant quotes and complains only about the last 
paragraph of Instruction No. 21. There are five other 
paragraphs preceding the one quoted by Plaintiff in his 
brief. (R. 158). The instruction correctly stated the 
rules applicable to both drivers as to using reasonable 
care, lookout, speed, and dist~nce. It is :!"undamental 
-1-l-
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that the j'_irv instructions when being examined on appeal 
mu~t be ~iewed as a whole and not in isolated segments. 
Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621 (Utah 1977). 
~he last paragraph of Instruction 21 was patterned 
after Section 41-6-69 U.C.A. which prohibits a person 
from suddenly stopping or decreasing speeds without first 
giving an appropriate signal. It was Defendant's contention 
that while an intersection was indeed being approached by 
both the bus and the automobile driven by Plaintiff, that 
Plainti:: cut in front of the U~A bus and abruptly 
stopped without warning some 50 feet in back of another 
bus and approximately 150 feet from the intersection. 
Plaintiff seems to argue in his brief (Appellant's 
brief ?· 9) that where an intersection is in sight a pre-
ceding automobile may suddenly stop unexpectedly since both 
drivers are aware that they will eventually have to stop 
at the intersection. Obviously, a driver approaching a 
red light is under an obligation to either slow and gradually 
stop at the light or to signal and warn a following driver 
that he intends on stopping before the light. 
In the instant case, for example, the plaintiff's 
stnted desi~2 to avoid emissions from the bus in front of 
him (R. 355) may have caused him to stop in back of the bus 
at a ffiuch greater distance than any other driver would have 
d0ne and made such stop totally unanticipated and abrupt. 
-15-
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Since defendant Miller stated that the bus w~s some 50 
feet ahead of the place in which the Mustang stop~ed, 
it was a question for the jury to determine whether 
Plaintiff's stop was sudden and whether a signal should 
have been given to the bus. ~ames v. Niebuhr, 380 P.2d 
287 (Wash. 1964). The evidencE viewed fron Defendants' 
position justified such an instruction. Case v. Olwell, 
P.2d 664 ('iJash. App. 1970). 
As to Plaintiff's claim that the braking lights then-
selves were adequate signals it should be observed that 
the question of whether a particular signal is appropriate 
is a question for the jury to decide under the circumstanc, 
of the case. Apkins v. Bayer, 464 P.2d 233 (i<an. 1970). 
This Court and the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals have 
both interpreted the requirement of signaling before sudde: 
stops or decrease in speed as requiring more than the 
simultaneous application of the brakes and the brake lighl 
As stated by the 10th Circuit: 
A fair inference to be drawn from the 
testimony of Maddis and his wife is that 
the brake light signal which was given by the 
Vernon automobile was simul ta!le0us · . .;i t'l its 
sudden decrease in speed. ender such circum-
stances, the signal was not effective and was 
not in compliance with the statute w'lich 
provides that an appropriate ~~~nal ~ust be 
given prior to stopping or sudJ~nlv decreasing 
the speed of a vehicle. Cnited St~tes v. First 
Security Bank cf Utah, 20B~424, 429 (10th 
Cir. 1953). 
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(utah 1966). For these reasons, the last paragraph of 
Instruction 21 was properly given by the trial court. 
C. The Trial Court Properly Gave Instruction No. 22. 
A review of Instruction No. 22 shows that it is a 
correct statement of the law concerning the obligation of 
a driver to ~aintain a reasonable lookout. There is no 
doubt that a driver has a duty to maintain a lookout 
to the rear as well as in all directions. Batty v. Mitchell, 
575 P.2cl 2.040 IUtai1 1978). It is a jury question as to 
whether a driver maintained his duty of lookout to the 
rear and whether such failure was a proximate cause of 
the accident. Hayden v. Cederlund, 263 P.2d 797 (Utah 1953). 
Plaintiff asserts in his brief that "the collision 
in question was caused bv the faulty brakes of the bus 
and by the fact that the bus driver did not keep a proper 
lookout and perhaps followed too close." (Appellant's 
brief, ~- 10). This statement is correct in light of 
Plaintiff's theory of the case but is totally incorrect as 
to Defendants' theory. Defendants maintained that the 
collision was caused because Plaintiff cut in front of 
the uTA bus and abruptly stopped for no apparent reason 
when the bus was only some 30 feet in back of the car. 
Defendants ~aintained that the brakes were operating properly 
and that the bus driver acted in a reasonable manner in light 
of the fact that Plaintiff had placed himself in that position 
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and had himself chosen to step some 50 feet in back of the 
preceding bus. 
Defendants were entitled to an instruction support1~c 
their theory of the case. B 1 a ck v . Mc Kn i 'ib_!, 5 6 2 P . 2 d 
621 (Utah 1977). If Instruction 22 auplicatcd Instructior. 
21 such duplication is not reversible error. Viood~1.ouse .. 
Johnson, 436 P.2d 442 (Utah 1968). Jchnson v. Cornwall 
warehouse Co., 398 P.2d 24 (Utah :_965). 
Thus, Instruction 21 was properly given. 
D. The Trial Court Properly Gave Instruction ~o. 23. 
p_~1~t1ff asserts that paragraph 3 of Instruction 23 
is an incorrect statement of the law. As note~ ea~~ier, 
however, the sirnul taneous pl 3.Ce:'.',en t of t:-,e b:::-akes ar.c t'.:e 
bra~ing lights has been deemed by this Court and the 
10th Circuit Court of Appeals net to compl:; '.·:ith the stat~: 
In fact, paragraph 3 of Instruction 23 is exactly the 
same instruction which was approved by this Court i!'l 
Stapley v. Salt Lake City Lines, 418 P.2d 779 (Ctah 1966). 
See also United States v. First Security Bank of Utah, 208 
F.2d 424 (10th Cir. l953). 
Again, Plaintiff contends that since the -.-ehicles 
were approaching an intersection the bus driver should ha~ 
anticipated the stop of Plaintiff regardless of any signa: 
given. This argument is based on the assumption that the 
Plaintiff stopped in an appropr~ate manner ~nd in an 
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appro9riate ~lace at the intersection. The evidence showed, 
however, th~t the point of accident was some 150 feet from 
the in~ersect1on and that the plaintiff stopped, according 
to Defendants' version of the evidence, approximately 50 
feet in back of the preceding UTA bus. 
Under these circumstances the jury was entitled to 
deter~i~e whether the Plaintiff suddenly stopped or suddenly 
decreased his speed in such a manner that a signal should 
have been given. 
Furthermore, any repetition as to Instructions 21 
and 22 is again, as ?reviously noted, harmless error since 
in each instruction a different principle concept was 
being explained to the jury. 
E. The Trial Court Properly Gave Plaintiff's 
Instruction No. 24. 
Plaintiff complains that the lower court improperly 
gave Instruction No. 24 which states that a person who is 
without negligence on his part and is suddenly and unexpectedly 
confronted with peril arising from either the actual presence 
or the apP2diance of imminent danger to himself or to others 
is not expected nor required to use the same judgment and 
prudence that mav be required of him in calmer and more 
deliberate moments. (R. 161). Plaintiff contends that 
even in the light most favorable to the defendants "it is 
uncontroverted that the bus driver followed the Christiansen 
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vehicle for some period of time prior to the time that 
the Christiansen vehicle car,0 to its slop." (.C..ppel lant' s 
brief p. 12). 
Plaintiff's assertion is completely erroneous. 
Defendant John Miller testified that upon leaving the bus 
stop at 1950 South 7th East he proceeded south on 7th Eas: 
at around 30 miles an hour. t?-. 29Sl. 2e stated t:-iat t~.E 
Mustang pulled into his lane so it was positioned about 
25 to 30 feet in front of the bus. \!'_. 308). ~liller 
stated that Plaintiff's vehicle was in his lane fer apprc~ 
mat:o~: :.·..:c or three seconds before Plaintif:'.: appliec his 
brakes anc abruptly stopped. Duri:ig this short t•,.;o or ::i:-
second perioc defendant ~iller was attempting to slow the 
bus down to increase the space between the vehicles but 
could not do so. (R. 309-312). ~hen the brake lights o~ 
the Mustang went on :.ir. Miller floored the trakes ir. a 
panic stop of the bus. (R. 313) . 
While Miller estimated that the distance the two car! 
traveled during the period of time after the Mustang 
entered his lane was 400 feet (R. 308), Mr. Rudolph Limpe:: 
Plaintiff's reconstruction expert, ad!'1itted t'.:-iat i:'.: t:-.e b~' 
driver's estimate of time and speed were correct the two 
vehicles would only have tra·;eled 88 feet toqethcr rather 
than 400. (R. 657). The jurors were entitlec: to deter:nic0 
based upon the evidence presented by the various parties 
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re accurate than his estimate as to traveled 
di:Jtc.nce. 
Assuming, there:cre, that the bus was traveling at 
30 ~iles an hour in the right lane and that the plaintiff 
cct in :ront o: the bus at approximately the same speed 
lea'1i;,g a 25 or 30 :oot space between them, and assuming 
that the car only traveled for two or three seconds before 
abruptly bra~ing, it was therefore proper for the jury 
to be instructed that the actions of the plaintiff had 
placed the defendant bus driver in a perilous situation 
which excused hi~ f rorn the same standard of care that is 
nor~ally applicable in cases where sudden and unexpected 
con:rcntations ha?e not occurred. 
~he Supre~e Court of Washingtin in Grapp v. Peterson, 
168 P.2d 400 (Wash. 1946) dealt with nearly an identical 
problem. In that case the plaintiff complained that a 
sudden peril instruction had been given and was not justified. 
The defendant, just as here, claimed that the plaintiff had 
darted in front of his vehicle and had abruptly stopped, 
therefore causing the collision. In finding that the 
giving of the sudden peril instruction was not erroneous 
the ~~shington Supreme Court stated the following: 
Obviously there is a difference between 
a situation where a respondent driver by his 
own choice follows so closely behind another 
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car upon the highway that he is unable to 
stop in time to avoid a collision with the leading 
car, and a situation where lhe leading car by 
passing and cutting in front of the respondent, 
places the respondent unwittin~l; in a following 
car position. Thus in the second situation, 
when the leading car stops suddenl~', the 
respondent is placed jn a position of sudden 
peril through no fault of his own. 
In the first situation the respondent 
clearly has the responsibility of avoiding the 
collision. In the second situation, in accord-
ance with the established ::'."'1le, the res2ondent 
ought not to be held to the sa~e burden to avoid 
a collision as one who has had ti~e for deli-
berate actions. The court's instruction ~o. 7 
properly applies to this latte:::- situation. 
Id. at 403. 
See also Jaeger v. Estep, 384 P.2d 174 (Ore. 1963). 
In sununary, therefore, the instructions gi'1en by the 
trial court and the one instruction refused to be given 
by the trial court were proper ccnsidering the state of 
the record at the conclusion of the trial. Appellant 
continually maintains that this is a case where a car 
slowed down and stopped for a red light and under such 
circumstances was not required to give any type of signal. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-15). Were the evidence con-
sistent with this view Plaintiff's position would be 
correct. However, Defendants' theory rested upon the 
assumption that the automobile being driven by Plaintiff 
cut in front of the bus, traveled ;,;i th the bus for only 
two or three seconds, abruptly made a stop, and did so 
some 50 feet from the preceding bus and some 150 feet 
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trcm the red light. 
The jJry was therefore entitled to determine under 
the circQmstances argued by Defendants whether or not a 
signal should have been given to the bus driver of this 
stop, whether the bus driver had done anything negligent 
in controlling the speed or distance between the vehicles 
and, of ccurse, whether the brakes of the bus were func-
tioning properly. Because of these considerations the 
jury was entitled to be instructed as to the various 
legal rules applicable so that the jurors could determine 
for themselves whether the circumstances justified the 
application of these rules. There was, therefore, no 
error committed by the lower court in the jury instructions. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY THE 
FAI:C,URE OF DEFEND?~'JT JOHN G. MILLER TO APPEAR 
.".ND TESTIFY. 
Plaintiff asserts that he was denied a fair trial 
because of certain "misrepresentations" of defense counsel 
concerning the appearance of John Miller at trial and 
because of the prejudicial effect his failure to appear 
had upon cross-examination. Both of these contentions 
are unfounded. 
First, Plaintiff makes numerous claims in his brief 
that he had been "misled" by the statements of defense 
counsel concerning Mr. Miller's availability. (Appellant's 
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brief, pp. 15-19). These assei·ti,:ins -J.re cor,pletely 
unsupported by the record and there is nc stipulation, 
testimony, or order as to any of the claired representa-
tions made by Defendants' counsel. It is fundamental 
that contentions not preserved in the appellate record 
cannot be considered on appeal. Skyline Leasing v. 
Datacap, 545 P.2d 512 (Utah 1976). Fur-:.!""1ermore, it is .... 
plaintiff's obligation to protect his record as to any 
supposed representations or stipc;la tions of ap::iosing coc;:.: 
and the failure to do so is fatal to such a clai8. ~!oun:: 
Bell v. Herrington, 555 P.2d 687 (~J.~. 1976) . 
.';eccnd, however, what :::iocumer1ts do e:c:.st in the recc: 
pertain~ng to ~iller's appearance directly contradict 
Plaintiff's assertion of misrepresentation. Cn .:-..pril 26, 
1980, some four days prior to the trial, the plaintiff 
himself filed a "Motion to Permit C.:se of Defencant ~lille:' 
Deposition in Lieu of Defendar.t' s .:..p;:iearar.ce." ( R. 91-92 
This motion stated the following: 
The plaintiff by and through counsel and 
pursuant to Rule 32 of the Ctah ?ules of 
Civil Procedure, hereby moves the court for 
an order granting the right to the plaintiff 
to produce a person at trial to act as the 
witness, John G. Miller. This ~oticn is 
based upon the following: 
1. Counsel for the defendant assured 
counsel for the plaintiff that he would 
produce the defendant at trial. 
2. Counsel for the defendant properly 
notified counsel for the plaintif:' b;· J.etter 
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cf OctotFr 22, 1979, that he was having diffi-
culty obta1~1ng the defendant's cooperation 
that he had attempted to subpoena him for ' 
trial, b 1 t as of April 22, 1980, had not 
been able to do so. 
3. Eased upon the letter of April 22, 
1980, from defendant's counsel, counsel for 
the plaintiff has caused a subpoena to be 
issued and will attempt to serve such subcoena 
before the trial date which commences on " 
~--.~?r.:_1 3, 2-980. 
4. In the event that the subpoena of 
either the defendant's counsel or the 
plaintiff's counsel is not served or, in 
the alternative, is not observed by the 
defendant, the plaintiff needs to utilize 
the testi~ony of the defendant at a deposition. 
Such deposition has been filed with the court 
by defendant's counsel. 
Plaintiff further moves for the publishing 
of the defendant's deposition for use at trial. 
Dated this 26th day of April, 1980. 
(signed) David ~. Robinson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Thus, the record shows that Defendants' counsel 
notified Plaintiff's counsel as early as October 22, 1979, 
of the problem involved in obtaining Mr. Miller for trial. 
A further letter of April 22, 1980, again alerted Plain-
tiff's counsel as to this problem. It is therefore 
difficult to believe that "counsel for defendant assured 
counsel for plaintiff up to and including the first day 
of trial that Mr. Miller would be available and that they 
'.-JOuld have ~lr. :-Ii~_ler available at the trial." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 18). 
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Likewise, Plaintiff's claim that on the first dav 0 ~ 
trial counsel for Defendants assured counsel for Plainti:: 
that "Hr. Miller was driving in fron Chicago .:rnd would !:;e 
available at the trial to testify," (Appellant's brief, 
p. 19) is also highly suspect in light of the opening 
statement made by Defendants' counsel on the first day o'.' 
trial. Mr. Tim Hanson, de:ense c::·u;1sel, stated the 
following to the jury: 
As you are already aware, I ~ill represent 
the Transit Authority and I also represent their 
driver, Mr. Miller. Mr. ~iller is not currently 
a~~loved. He has been for some time with the 
Tr~nslt Authority and the evidence will show 
that he currently drives a long-distance true~. 
Hopefully we will have him here but he will be 
able to testify in addition to his deposition 
that has been taken. 
I don't know if you ~new what depositions 
are, but that is a procedure where the attorneys 
before a trial come to court here, take testimonv 
under oath from parties or witnesses or ·,.,;hoe'.·er -
we want who knew something about the accident. 
Fortunately in this case that has been done with 
regard to Mr. Miller so you will have the benefit 
of his testimony. (Tr. 331). 
Certainly, this statement does not seer:i to reflect Plaint:: 
assertion that defense counsel had intended on Mr. :·!ille: 
arrival the following day. 
Third, it should be noted that the deposition of ~r. 
Miller was introduced and read into the record by the 
plaintiff--not the defendants. This Court should note 
that Plaintiff made no objection as tc any prejudice 
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occurring from the reading of this deposition. (Tr. 461-
4 6 2) • It is therefore hard to conceive how Plaintiff 
was ~rejudiced when he specifically requested the reading 
cE the aeposition both prior to trial and during trial 
and further failed to object to any alleged prejudice 
which ~culd occur by the absence of Mr. ~tiller. 
Finally, the claimed prejudice of being unable to 
cross-examine ~iller as to the accident report he previously 
filed is also totall~· groundless. The Transportation Loss 
Report da~ed January 18, 1977, referred to by Plaintiff 
in his brief (Appellant's brief, ~- 16), was actually 
introduced into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 31. For 
t'.:ns reason alone the jury had the benefit of the testimony 
of ~iller and could compare it with the alleged discrepancy 
contained in the Transportation Loss ~eport. 
More i~portantly, however, this report was specifi-
cally referred to d~ring the time of the deposition and 
Mr. Miller referred to it throughout his deposition testi-
mony. (R. 291-320). As an example, Mr. Wells in questioning 
Mr. ~1iller entered into the following dialogue: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
~ow, you have indicated in your loss report 
that vou filed with the company, you stated 
here that you bumped into the rear of a car 
just as I was leaving a stop. 
Just after I had left the stop. 
So, you're now telling us that your recollec-
tion today is different than it was at this 
t~!"'.'.e? 
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A. Well, that's · . .;hat it s0ys, just as I ·.-.r.'\s 
leaving the stop, ~es. 
Q. Didn't you state that t~2 sto~ was a tlcc~ 
or two back? 
A. It's not a block or two. 1950 to 2050, 
about a block. (?. 301). 
Mother example can te :ound in t'.:e te.sti:-:-io:--.::· ·.·.rhe:.:-e 
Mr. Wells states, "Now, on ca0e 2 ~ - t:l-':e report, t:-.e::· ~.a·:: 
a section here called conditio~ c~ e~uip~ent. 'fc·_i have 
specifically under the place where '~ refers to defect:s 
stated, 'brakes very spongy . Bus had received a road 
. -";_ :::.ct:::-iie:- i.:-i the day.' ~·Jould :.:cu tell \JS a.tout t:-iat.' 
In addition, an examination of E:~hibit 31P as co::+:: 
with Mr. Miller's testi~ony shows no contradiction on its 
face. The Transportation Loss ?.eport C.oes net descri::e •· 
movement of the Mustang in any •.-.ra'/ as to ·,;here l t car:-,e 
from, how long it was in front of the :lri'ler, or ar:y ot~.e: 
actions it took except for tbe fact tr.at it: "stopped 
abruptly." The testimony o: :Olr. Miller, therefore, ::iere:; 
supplemented and explained in detail the ratr.e:c cursor::· 
report filed with the UTA. 
Plaintiff in his brief has erroneously used the wo~ 
"Defendant" rather than "Plaintif:" in his head1nc; of 
Point II by stating: 
The Defendant was Der:ied a Fair Trial bv t~e 
Failure of Defendant John G. ~1ller to ~ppe.'lr 
at Trial . (."'.ppellant's brief, ?· 15). 
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In ~ctuality, this statement is correct since if any pre-
judice occurred bv the absence of Mr. Miller it was to 
~he defendants, not to Plaintiff. Defendants were forced 
to rely upon the deposition of Miller which had been taken 
entirely by Plaintiff's attorney. Without Miller's testi-
~ony there ~as no evidence as to a different version of 
the accident than that told by the plaintiff. 
For this reason, it is inconceivable that Defendants 
would not wish c·!r. Miller present in the courtroom to 
testify so that defense counsel could frame the questions 
and present the evidence for the benefit of Defendants. 
An"' hardship in Miller's failure to attend went directly 
to Defendant CTA which was then forced to rely entirely 
upon the defosition of ~r. Miller taken only by the plain-
tiff's attorney. 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the failure of 
Miller to appear at trial in no way prejudiced the plaintiff 
and t~e clai~ed error is totally without merit. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN F;>.ILING TO 
ICJSTRuCT ?HE JuRY ON THE CONSEQCEHCES OF 
TnEIR APPORTIOllMENT OF NEGLIGENCE. 
Plaintiff argues in his brief that he was prejudiced 
because the jury was not told that a finding of over 50% 
negligence en the part of Plaintiff would preclude any 
recovery. Plaintiff admits that no formal objection was 
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made and that no proposed instruction was submitted to 
the trial court. Since Plaintiff is required under Rule 
51, u.R.C.P., to specifically object to the failure of 
giving instructions and to file written requests of pro-
posed instructions, the failure to do so waives any argun, 
Plaintiff may now make. 
In fact, the instant case is no different than that 
case cited by Plaintiff, Lampkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 
(Utah 1979), where the plaintiff there also failed to 
properly object in the lower court and this Court stated, 
"This point is raised for the first time on appeal and 
hence was not ruled upon by the trial court. Consequenfr· 
we do not consider it on appeal." Id. at 533. 
It should also be noted, however, that in those state: 
referred to by Plaintiff which now allow a jury to be tol: 
the consequences of its verdict, the large majority of 
states have statutorily amended the comparative neglige~e 
laws to permit this action. 
Even if this is a judicial matter, however, the 
overruling of the McGinn decision should require extensi~ 
argument and briefing by both parties in the lower court 
and, of course, should comply with all procedural require-
ments as to preserving objections and error in the lower 
court. 
For these reasons, Defendants believe it unnecessa0 
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to further comment upon this claimed error now raised 
by Plaintiff for the first time in his brief. 
POINT IV 
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT A RESULT OF SYMPATHY, 
BL\S, PASSION OR PREJUDICE A..'.JD IS FULLY 
SUPPOR'I';wLZ I:.J LIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
It is basic that ~hen a jury verdict is supported by 
competent evidence it is left unaltered by an appellate 
court unless there is a showing of passion and prejudice. 
heber Basin \-later Conservancy District v. Skeen, 328 P.2d 
730 (Ctah 1958). It has been stated that before damages 
will be set aside on the basis of passion or prejudice 
the conscience of the court must be shocked by the inadequacy 
or the excessiveness of the award. Town of Jackson v. Shaw, 
569 P.2c 1246 \:~yo. 1977). 
Appellant argues that the jury was "acting contrary 
to the weight of the evidence in the case and had been 
confused considering the apportionment of negligence, 
the effect on damages and was clearly a result of sympathy, 
bias, passion and prejudice." (Appellant's brief, p. 26). 
'I'his assertion is, once again, unfounded in the record. 
As mentionec previously there was ample evidence for 
the jury to conclude that the sudden and unexpected action 
of the plaintiff in darting into the right lane of traffic 
and suddenly stopping some 50 feet in back of a bus was 
a negligent acLion and that the conduct of the plaintiff 
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was the major contributing cause of the accident. 
Even the authority cited by plaintiff, Heff ~ Heff, 
concludes that in certain situations the apportionment 
of negligence between a stopped vehicle and the followins 
vehicle will depend upon the circw~stances of the case. 
Quoting from that quotation cited b:: ?lainti:: in his 
brief (Appellant's brief, p. 27) full! supr:orts :::lefenda'.'.~' 
argument in the trial: 
It was heretofore indicated that not all 
rearend collisions are settled or liti;ated en 
a percentage of 100%. Obviously, in cases 
~~ere the plaintiff stops without sicnal or 
stoos in the countrv or at a olace where stoos 
are not ordinarilv made, or stops abruptly, 
this percentage must ce modified._ Ordinarilf, 
brake lights at the stoppi~g car are sufficient 
warning. However, there are instances where 
the driver of the stopping car is aware, or 
should in the exercise of ordinarv care be 
aware, of traffic conditions tc the rear 
which make stopping at that point and time 
negligence. Heft & Heft, Comparative Clegli-
gence Manual, Section 4.30 (1971) (Emphasis 
added) . 
Thus, as to liability, there is ample evidence unde~ 
Defendants' theory of the accident to support a finding 
of 70% negligence on the part of Plaintiff and 30% negli-
gence on the part of Defendants. The ar;uments ;:iade by 
Plaintiff in his brief are properly addressed to the jucy 
and not to this Court since whether the bus had "sufficie:· 
time to stop without colliding with the plaintiff" is a 
matter of judgment based l'.[lon the facts whic'.1 is clearl]' 
within the province of the fact:"inder to deterLline. 
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Likewise, the assessment of damages by the jury is 
also within the realm of the evidence. The jury found 
special damases of $7,700 which included the claim of 
medical expenses and lost wages. The jury could have 
bel~eved, for example, the testimony of Dr. Andrew Rouff 
who is the chief of orthopedics at the Salt Lake Veterans 
?.C.ministration Hospital, and who examined the plaintiff 
on behalf of the defendants. This witness concluded that 
he coLld find no objective evidence to support the sub-
jective complaints made by the plaintiff. (Tr. 502). 
The jury could easily have believed that much of the 
medical treatment received by the plaintiff was for the 
purpose of making it appear that the plaintiff was seriously 
injured. Cn cross-examination Plaintiff's own doctcr 
admitted that he could not understand ~hy the plaintiff 
continually visited him when the plaintiff was already 
being treated by an orthopedic specialist. (Tr. 475-476) 
The jury could also have believed that since Plaintiff's 
attorney suggested a specialist to consulting Dr. Wright 
within several days after the accident that much of the 
expense and claimed injuries were solely for the purpose 
of obtaining a judgment against the defendants. (Tr. 480) 
Likewise, as to the loss of wages Plaintiff made a 
claim of some $16,000 for his inability to work during the 
period cf time he claimed he was unable to return to 
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Kennecott. The jury could have believed, however, that 
Plaintiff could easily have worked at a jot less strenuous 
although lower paying at Kennecott had he so desired or 
could, as Dr. Horne, Plaintiff's physician admitted, have 
worked doing plumbing privately or teaching pluwbing 
classes. (Tr. 594). The record will show, therefore, 
that there was ample evi~encE for the jury ':o conclude 
that most of the lost wages we.:e \lnnecessa:-y and could 
have been offset by Plaintiff had he chosen to work. 
Similarly, the award of general damages of 55,000 is 
not so inadequate to shock the conscience of the court. 
If the jury concluded that Plaintiff's injuries wer~ 
grossly exaggerated or agreed wi':h Dr. Rouff that even 
giving credence to Plaintiff's subjective co~plaints 
Plaintiff only suffered two percent partial total dis-
ability (Tr. 501), then $5,000 is certainly not out of 
line. 
It was for the jury to detecr,ine the credibility of 
the evidence based upon the testimony and de:r.eanor of the 
witnesses. For example, the plaint:!..ff ':estified in the 
liability aspect of the case that he had been stopped rouc: 
a minute at the intersection and that he locked in his 
mirror and saw the bus coming when it was still half a 
block away. (Tr. 387-388). This version of the accider.t 
was completely contrar:/ to the testimon~, of t'-1e bus driver 
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and w~s a v~rsicn of the accident which was hardly argued 
at trial nor on this appeal. Rather, Plaintiff's attorneys 
seemed to concentrate upon the correctness of Defendants' 
version of thC> accident but attempted to show that faulty 
brakes prevented the bus from stopping quickly enough 
after Plainti:f's car had darted in front of it. 
The jury was certainly entitled to measure the cre-
8ibility of ?laintiff not only as to the liability aspects 
of t~e case but also as to the damage claim--both special 
and general. There is no evidence suggested by Plaintiff 
o~ any conduct during the trial which would give rise to 
a claim of passion or prejudice and, in fact, it would 
logically be assu.:ned that any prejudice wou2.d be against 
the corporate entity of UTA or the driver who failed to 
attend his own trial. 
This same argument of prejudice was raised in the 
lower cc:iurt by Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and the 
lo·.ver ccurt, in its discretion, rejected such argument. 
It is axiomatic in this state that the granting or 
refusing of motions for new trial is a discretionary 
matter with the lower court. Uptown Appliance and Radio 
Co. ·1. Flint, 249 P.2d 826 (Utah 1955) · 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, Plaintiff's 
contention that the jury verdict was influenced by passion 
and prejudice and was contrary to the weight of the 
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evidence is totally without merit and must b~ rejected. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER couRT' s REFUSAL TO GEi\NT Pu,Ic;TIFF' s 
MOTION TO .~MEND THE CO~lPL:Hi\T TO .-'1SSEET 
WILLFUL AND WANTON NEGLIGENCE DID "OT DE~JY 
PLAINTIFF A FAIR TRI~L. 
Plaintiff claims that he was denied a fair trial 
because Judge Croft on Januar~ :s, :?3C, refused =o all~ 
Plaintiff to amend his complai~t see~1ns punitive dana;es 
and to add additional defendants. Plainti f: 's :-:.otion was 
~ased on several assertions: (R. 59-60) first, that be 
bus driver admitted that the bus had faulty brakes when 
it left the garage; second, that the de:endant conplaine: 
to his supervisor that the brakes were defecti~e but the 
supervisor said the brakes were all ri;ht and told the 
driver to take the bus anywa:/; third, that the "brakes 
were bad at the time the said Cus 2-e:t the gara9e 11 ; :oi..:~t~. 
that an investigator for Plainti.::'f had obtai;-ied nunerCJ•Js 
statements from employees of UTA who stated that it was 
the management policy of UTA to senc1 b:.;ses out onto the 
road even with defective brakes; .::'ifth, that it is the 
policy of UTA to send buses out with defective brakes; 
and sixth, that this conduct is a willful and wanton 
disregard of the safety of others. 
Plaintiff in his brief makes nu~erous assertions 
as to what transpired at the January 13, 1980 hearing 
and the reasons that the lower ccurt denied Plaintiff's 
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moti'"'n ·,,i_':.J::out any record reference to such statement. 
In fact, such reference cannot be made because the record 
is barren ~f any of the proceedings which occurred on 
that date. 
However, the order signed by Judge Croft states the 
folLY.vins: 
Upon reviewing the basis for the request 
for leave to amend and being advised by 
counsel for the plaintiff that the plaintiff 
could not in good faith allege malice in 
SU?port of his claim for punitive damages 
and the Court, being fully advised in the 
premises and qood cause otherwise appearing, 
it is hereby ordered that the plaintiff's motion 
to amend his complaint tc add a count for 
?Uniti7e damages and to add additional defendants 
i_s denied. (R. 69). 
Since this is the only statement appearing in the 
record as to the grounds for denial of Plaintiff's motion, 
it must be assumed that this was in fact the reason the 
lower court denied Plaintiff's motion. Because malice was 
an ~ssential element of Plaintiff's claim it was therefore 
required that the lower court deny Plaintiff's motion. 
In addition, however, Rule 15 U.R.C.P. leaves the 
lower court with complete discretion as to whether a party 
should be allowed to amend a complaint. Davis Stock Co. v. 
Hill, 268 ?.2d 988 (Utah 1955). Since this matter was set 
for trial in less than two months from the time Plaintiff's 
motion was ~ade it was entirely within the discretion of 
the lower court to deny this new claim even if Plaintiff's 
-37-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
statement in his brief is correct that the time element 
was considered by the lower court. 
Further, failure to amend the complaint had no effect 
whatsoever upon the outcome of this trial. Had Plaintiff 
been able to bring in 100 people who stated that CTA 
customarily released buses which had defecti•;e brakes, suer. 
evidence would be imrnaterial to this case unless it could 
also be shown that the bus involved in ~he accident had 
defective brakes. 
While Mr. Miller did not believe the brakes were 
operating properly he never stated in his deposition that 
they were "defective." The signout mechanic wr.o ~lr. :-1iLc: 
gave the bus to for a test run disagreed with ~iller and 
stated they were satisfactory. More importantly, however, 
the findings by the UTA mechanics following the accident 
showed only that the slack adjusters were somewhat out of 
adjustment. 
Plaintiff's own expert, Rudolph Limpert, admitted tha: 
based upon these findings the fact that one wheel was not 
properly adjusted would have had no effect upon the brak1r.: 
ability of the bus assuming the other brakes were pror::er. 
Since Plaintiff produced no evidence to show defective 
brakes on the remaining three wheels, Plaintiff cornpletely 
failed in his burden to show defective brakes. 
This failure is especially apparent in light of the 
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foreman and engineer who both stated 
tr.e rr,c~hanic the following day did not 
jetract fro~ the efficiency of the braking system and 
that tests had Leen run showing that the bus would have 
been in ccnpl~te ca~pliance with state standards even 
assu."'.li!v; the ·.nrst pcssible case speculated by the 
9lai;;.ti=':':. 
Thus, had t~e jury awarded punitive damages such award 
~~ tc be overturned as a ~atter of law since 
there would have ~e 0 n nc evidence to even support the 
~asic reguirencnt cf a showing~ ·• ~he brakes were defec-
tive re9ardless u- any supposed policy that UTA may have 
had. 
For these ==~sens, the trial court properly denied 
Plaintif:':' s :cot.i~>n. tG an.end the complaint and it cannot 
be said under any stretch of the facts existing in this 
case that ?lainti:':f was in any way prejudiced by such 
der11al. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff continually throughout his brief presents 
cnl1 those facts wh~ch he wishes to utilize in su~port of 
his theory of the accident. Plaintiff ignored the evidence 
and testimony which the jury could have believed supporting 
Naturally, as long as there is sub-
support t~e jury verdict this Court 
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will not disturb it. 
The instructions given by the lower court were 
correct in that they explained rules of law applicable to 
this case and were based upon factual evidence in the 
record. Whether or not Plaintiff caused this accident 
by his change of lanes and abrupt stop was solely a ques-
tion for the jury and the jury was, therefore, entitled to 
know the legal standards applicable. 
The absence of the defendant Miller to attenc the 
trial was prejudicial only to the defendant UTri since it 
was necessary for it to rely entirely upon a deposition 
taken by Plaintiff's own attorney. There is nothing in 
the record to show that defendant UTA or defense counsel 
deliberately misrepresented or mislead Plaintiff's attorne7! 
as to the appearance of Mr. Miller. Finally, the supposec 
prejudice occurring because of the inability to cross-
examine Mr. Miller is totally lacking in merit since 
Plaintiff interrogated him concerning the transportation 
report during his deposition, the report was actually 
introduced into evidence, and the report did not contradic: 
Miller's depositional testimony. 
The claim of Plaintiff as to instructing the jury 
concerning the effect of their verdict was waived by 
Plaintiff's failure to submit a jury instruction to the 
lower court or to object to the failure of sue~ instructie" 
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being given. 
There is no evidence of bias or prejudice existing 
in this verdict. As has been stated, there is substantial 
evidence to support both the liability aspect and the 
damage aspect of the jury verdict. As such, the verdict 
should be upheld. 
Finally, the failure of the lower court to amend 
Plaintiff's complaint for punitive damages is also ground-
less since the evidence at trial does not support Plaintiff's 
contention of defective brakes even viewing it most favorably 
to him. And, furthermore, Plaintiff would have been unable 
to show malice on the part of defendant UTA even had such 
brake failure been estatlished. 
For these reasons, therefore, the verdict of the 
lower court should be sustained and the judgment of the 
lower court affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, /}. ~/v !~ , ~ ' ' v1'~ ~~ot ' . Han'!S:( 
Attorney for Respondents 
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